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Abstract
Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered: Sil-
icon Valley is probably the best-known example. Clusters differ in the
contracts they use, and in how they perform. I explore the link between
spillovers, contractual design and performance. I find that more "incom-
plete" contracts, with fewer contingencies linking entrepreneurs’ rewards
to performance benchmarks, become optimal when positive spillovers are
large. The contracts enable the innovative entrepreneur and his investor
to extract some of the surplus they generate through positive spillovers for
new entrants. This provides a new rationale for contractual incompleteness,
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JEL classification numbers: D82, D86, G24, L22.
Keywords: innovation, spillovers, venture capital, incomplete con-
tracts.
∗Toulouse School of Economics, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée
de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France (roberta.dessi@tse-fr.eu).
†I have benefited from comments and discussions with Bruno Biais, Catherine Casamatta,
Jacques Crémer, Guido Friebel, Bruno Jullien, Augustin Landier, Ines Macho-Stadler, Thomas
Mariotti, Patrick Rey, Jean Tirole, seminar participants at TSE, the MOVE Workshop on
Venture Capital, and the PWRI Workshop.
1. Introduction
Venture capital firms and innovative start-ups tend to be highly clustered1, ben-
efiting from localized spillovers; probably the best-known example is California’s
Silicon Valley. The greater success of Silicon Valley, even relative to other impor-
tant clusters like the Route 128 corridor in Massachusetts, has attracted consider-
able attention2. Interestingly, the design of venture capital contracts also exhibits
significant regional variation: California contracts, in particular, tend to contain
fewer contingencies3 - for ease of exposition, I will refer to them as being more
"incomplete".
Could there be a causal link between regional differences in contract design,
spillovers, and differences in performance? I explore this possibility by focusing
on one intriguing contractual difference: venture capital contracts in California
typically contain significantly fewer contingencies linking entrepreneurs’ rewards
to explicit performance benchmarks. As documented by Kaplan and Stromberg
(2003), rewards include additional equity or options for the entrepreneur, the
provision of new funds, or suspension of dividend payments to venture capitalists.
Explicit performance benchmarks include: completing clinical tests; completing a
new business plan to enter new markets; reaching a threshold number of customers
who have purchased the product and given positive feedback; developing new
facilities.
I develop a model that endogenizes this "California effect" on contract design:
in the presence of sufficiently large and positive spillovers, it becomes optimal to
rely on more "incomplete" venture capital contracts that do not tie entrepreneurs’
rewards to explicit performance benchmarks. The key advantage of these incom-
plete contracts is that they enable the innovative start-up (the "incumbent") and
its venture capital investor ("V C1") to extract some of the surplus that they gen-
erate through positive spillovers for new entrants. How? By keeping information
about the magnitude of potential spillovers confidential, so that only the informed
investor (V C1) is willing to fund a new entrant.
In a nutshell, the idea is the following: if the incumbent is successful at the
1See Chen, Gompers, Kovner and Lerner (2009).
2See Saxenian (1994), and Glaeser, Kerr and Ponzetto (2009).
3Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find that explicit performance benchmarks are used signifi-
cantly less in California ventures. California contracts are also less likely to contain redemption
rights for the venture capitalists or time vesting clauses for the entrepreneur’s (founder’s) shares.
Bengtsson and Ravid (2009) focus on "investor-friendly" contingencies, and find that they tend
to be used less in California contracts. Section 5 relates these findings to the model.
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intermediate stage, it generates positive spillovers, making entry by a second en-
trepreneur profitable. For example, the incumbent is successful in developing a
product or technology that generates demand for complementary products, or re-
duces costs for a new entrant. If the incumbent’s success is publicly observable, the
implications for entry will be clear to everyone, and competition among venture
capitalists to fund the new entrant will eliminate any rents. However, in many
cases information about a venture-funded innovative start-up is only observed by
the venture’s entrepreneur and its investor: knowledge about the details, quality,
scope and reliability of a newly-developed product or technology is often private,
soft information4 (in the absence of a patent, see below). If the information is
kept confidential, uncertainty about a new entrant’s expected profitability can
deter uninformed investors from funding him. It is then possible for V C1 to fund
him, when entry is efficient, earning an informational rent - i.e., extracting some
of the surplus generated by the positive spillovers.
A key condition for this to work is that the incumbent should not be able,
at this stage, to engage in a profitable (secret) side deal with another investor at
the expense of V C1, credibly revealing the confidential information to the other
investor in return for a payment or favor. Thus, the incumbent should not possess
hard evidence that he can show to the other investor. This is where the "com-
pleteness" of the financing contract between the incumbent and V C1 can become
a disadvantage. If the contract specifies a reward contingent on a benchmark that
is informative about the potential for profitable entry, payment of the reward be-
comes hard evidence of the realized contingency, available to the incumbent. For
example, the reward can consist of additional equity or options for the incumbent.
Since the incumbent does not care whether the entrant is funded by V C1 or by
another venture capitalist, he would be willing, in return for a payment or favor,
to show the evidence to another venture capitalist5, undermining the equilibrium
in which V C1 captures all the informational rents while other venture capitalists
4Note that, while the entrepreneur and the investor possess only soft information, a complete
contract can elicit this information from them by building an appropriate mechanism (see Maskin
(1977), Moore (1992)). Such mechanisms are not necessary, on the other hand, if the information
is verifiable by a court through other means in the event of a dispute (e.g., in U.S. law, pre-
trial discovery enables each party in a lawsuit to obtain evidence from the opposing party and
from non-parties through a variety of methods, including requests for answers to interrogatories,
production of documents or things, admissions and depositions, and inspections).
5Note that it is sufficient for the evidence to be shown to the venture capitalist. Thus
confidentiality clauses are unlikely to be a sufficient deterrent, as breach would be extremely
difficult to prove.
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remain uninformed. It may then be optimal, ex ante, to rely instead on a contract
that does not specify rewards contingent on such benchmarks.
The model makes a number of predictions, including:
• "Incomplete" contracts, that do not tie the entrepreneur’s rewards to ex-
plicit performance benchmarks, should be more prevalent where positive
spillovers and the expected profitability of new entrants are higher. These
contracts make it possible to relax financing constraints and elicit higher
entrepreneurial effort.
• The use of explicit performance benchmarks that are more informative from
the perspective of a potential entrant should be more limited, other things
held equal.
• Explicit performance benchmarks are more likely to be included, other
things being equal, when their achievement is publicly observable.
The first prediction implies that clustering, localized spillovers and incomplete
contracts can be mutually reinforcing: when positive spillovers are substantial, in-
complete contracts become optimal, relaxing financing constraints and increasing
entrepreneurial effort, which in turn leads to more spillovers. This may help to
account for the contracting style and performance of venture capitalists in Silicon
Valley. The second and third predictions are consistent with the finding by Ka-
plan and Stromberg (2003) that a significant proportion of financings (over 17%)
are contingent on financial performance benchmarks (e.g. revenue and operating
profit goals), while many of the non-financial performance benchmarks commonly
used would be publicly observable6.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I complete this section by
discussing the relationship with the existing literature. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 analyzes the benchmark case without entry (and hence without
spillovers). The main analysis is presented in section 4. Empirical implications
are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
6Examples include granting of patents, FDA approval of new drugs, and hiring of new key
executives. Examples of performance benchmarks that are unlikely to be publicly observable
include: completing clinical tests; securing a threshold number of customers who have purchased
the product and give positive feedback; completing a new business plan for entering new markets;
acquiring a certain technology.
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1.1. Relationship to the literature
This paper is related to several important literatures:
(1) Financial contracts and entry
Here the closest links are with Aghion and Bolton (1987), and Cestone and
White (2003). Aghion and Bolton analyze a setting where a buyer and a seller
negotiate a contract under a threat of entry by another seller. They show that
an exclusive contract with appropriately designed liquidated damages can be used
optimally to extract some of the entrant’s surplus: the damages act as an entry
fee. In the present paper, contracts between an entrepreneur and a venture capi-
talist may also be designed strategically to extract surplus from a future entrant,
but the mechanism is quite different: the contract is designed to limit information
leakage to other venture capitalists, enabling the first venture capitalist to earn
informational rents. Cestone and White study instead how financial contracts can
be designed to deter product market entry when financial markets are imperfectly
competitive. In our model, financial markets are competitive, and entry is effi-
cient in the presence of positive spillovers: contracts are therefore designed not to
deter entry, but rather to capture some of the surplus generated by the positive
spillovers.
(2) Venture capital
A large body of theoretical work has studied the allocation of cashflow rights
and control rights7, with a particular emphasis on explaining the widespread use
of convertible securities in venture capital financings. Cuny and Talmor (2005) are
perhaps the closest to this paper, since they analyze instead the choice between
"milestone" and "round" financing. They focus on a very different issue though,
namely the impact of these two forms of financing on the effort incentives of both
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, in a setting without spillovers or entry.
(3) Incomplete contracts
A very large literature examines the causes and consequences of contractual in-
completeness8. My work is perhaps closest in spirit to papers that have explored
the strategic value of incomplete contracts when some aspects of performance
7See, among others, Bergemann and Hege (1998), Bottazzi et al. (2005), Casamatta (2003),
Cestone (2000), Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Dessí (2005), Hellmann (1998), Kaplan et al. (2003),
Lerner and Schoar (2005), Repullo and Suarez (2000, 2004), and Schmidt (2003).
8See, among others, Anderlini and Felli (1994, 1999), Battigalli and Maggi (2002), Bolton
and Faure-Grimaud, Dye (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990, 1999),
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Segal (1999), Tirole (2009), Williamson (1975, 1985).
5
and/or actions are not verifiable9, including Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991),
Bernheim and Whinston (1998), and Martimort and Piccolo (2010). As in these
papers, my focus is on strategic incompleteness, but in a different way. I show
that it can be optimal not to specify certain contingencies in a contract because
execution of the contract generates hard evidence about the realized contingency
ex post, and this may lead to damaging leakage of information to other parties.
Although I explore the implications in a specific application to venture capital
contracts, the point is more general. It applies potentially to a variety of settings
where the realization of relevant contingencies is observed by the contracting par-
ties ex post, but not by other parties. In such settings information can be elicited
from the contracting parties by building an appropriate mechanism into the origi-
nal contract. I show that this may not be optimal if it permits information leakage
that is sufficiently damaging to the parties. This could help to explain why such
mechanisms are not often observed in practice.
My work is also related to papers that have explored the informational impli-
cations of incomplete contracts. Allen and Gale (1992) consider an environment
in which different agents have different abilities to manipulate information about
contingencies. Non-contingent contracts emerge in equilibrium because they do
not create incentives to engage in such manipulation. Spier (1992) shows how, in
the presence of (exogenous) transactions costs, an informed principal may prefer
to offer an incomplete contract to signal that his "type" is "good"10. My paper
focuses instead on the hard information generated ex post, when a contractual
contingency is realized, and the contract is executed.
(4) Clustering and spillovers
An extensive literature explores the importance of entrepreneurship and inno-
vation clusters, and localized spillovers11. This literature has been largely separate
from the literature on contract design. My paper builds on insights from both, and
9On the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in such settings see also Schmidt and
Schnitzer (1995), Pearce and Stacchetti (1998).
10See also Aghion and Hermalin (1990), who study the desirability of legal restrictions on
contracting to prevent inefficient signaling.
11See Audretsch and Feldman (2004) for a review and discussion. Glaeser and Kerr (2009)
document the importance of several factors for entrepreneurship clustering: the abundant pres-
ence of small independent suppliers, labor market pooling, and knowledge spillovers. Ellison,
Glaeser and Kerr (2010) study the impact of these factors on industrial agglomeration. Evi-
dence of the importance of geographic proximity for knowledge spillovers is provided by Acs
et al. (1994), Agrawal et al. (2008), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Audretsch and Stephan
(1996), Jaffe (1989), Jaffe et al. (1993), and Zucker et al. (1998). Fallick et al. (2006) and
Freedman (2008) document the importance of labor market pooling.
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provides a link between the two. In particular, it shows how spillovers and con-
tract design can be mutually reinforcing in clusters of innovative entrepreneurial
firms and venture capitalists.
2. The model
The model has three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. At date 0, an entrepreneur may enter a new
industry and invest in a project, call it project I (I for “incumbent”). At date 1,
the state γ is realized (see below). At this stage another entrepreneur may enter
the industry and invest in a related project, call it project E (E for “entrant”).
The probability of success of project I at date 2 will depend on the state γ and on
whether entry occurs. The state γ will also affect the probability of success of the
second project E. Entrepreneurs possess no capital and need to raise finance from
investors (venture capitalists). For simplicity, there is no discounting. All agents
in the model are assumed to be risk neutral and protected by limited liability.
2.1. The incumbent
Project I requires an initial outlay of value KI. The first entrepreneur (henceforth
also called the incumbent) faces considerable uncertainty about his project’s re-
turns when he invests at t = 0: some of the uncertainty is resolved at t = 1, when
the state γ is realized. For simplicity, γ is assumed to take one of two values:
γG (“good” state) or γB (“bad” state), with 1 > γG > γB > 0. If there is no
entry, project I yields verifiable returns R at t = 2 with probability γ, and zero
otherwise, where R > KI > 0. Thus γ represents the probability of “success”
(high returns) in the second period in the absence of competition. The impact of
competition is considered below.
If project I is undertaken at t = 0, the incumbent chooses his effort level
e ∈ [0, eH ], where 0 < eH < 1. The cost of effort is given by c(e) ≡
1
2
e2.
Entrepreneurial effort increases the probability of the good state: specifically,
the good state occurs with probability e. To capture the uncertainty inherent
in innovative activity, I assume that the bad state occurs with some non-trivial
probability even when the incumbent exerts the maximal feasible effort. At the
same time, entrepreneurial effort is crucially important; I therefore assume that,
leaving aside entry considerations, the project is not worth undertaking with zero
effort:
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• (A1) γBR < KI
In what follows, I denote by∆γ = γG−γB > 0 the difference in the probability
of success between the good state and the bad state. For ease of exposition, I also
assume that12
• (A2) (∆γ + µ)R  eH
2.2. The entrant
At t = 1, a second entrepreneur (henceforth also called the entrant) may enter
the industry and invest in a related project. This project requires an initial
outlay of value KE. I assume that if the incumbent has been successful during
the first period (i.e. γ = γG), this generates new profitable opportunities for
prospective entrants. I model this as simply as possible by assuming that the
entrant’s expected returns are equal to πH when γ = γG and πL when γ = γB,
with πH > KE > πL > 0. We can then think of πH − πL as capturing the
magnitude of the positive spillover generated by the incumbent’s success. I will
denote by S ≡ πH − KE the expected profits (surplus) from undertaking the
entrant’s project in state γG.
If the second entrepreneur decides to enter, he has an impact on the profitabil-
ity of the incumbent. I model this by assuming that entry reduces the incumbent’s
success probability to γ − µ, where γG − µ > γB > µ > 0. I further assume that
it is nevertheless efficient to fund the entrant when the state is "favorable"; that
is, the surplus from the entrant’s project outweighs the cost of entry imposed on
the incumbent:
• (A3) S > µR
Finally, I assume that:
• (A4) It is not worth funding the entrant unless the state is known to be
"favorable"
12As will become clear below, this assumption simply means that the first-best effort level is
potentially feasible in most cases of interest for our analysis. The only exception is incomplete
contracts in section 3, where for sufficiently high values of S the first-best effort could, in
principle, exceed (∆γ + µ)R. I therefore incorporate the feasibility constraint e  eH explicitly
into the problem and solution for that case, described by Proposition 2.
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A4 seems a reasonable assumption in settings where there is sufficient un-
certainty ex ante about the incumbent’s success at the intermediate stage
(regardless of effort), and his success at the intermediate stage is crucial
for the entrant’s expected profitability - these settings are the main focus
of the present paper13. In other settings, the assumption can be made for
analytical convenience, since it guarantees the existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium14.
2.3. Investors
Entrepreneurs seek financing from venture capitalists, who possess enough exper-
tise and sector-specific knowledge to be able to evaluate entrepreneurs and their
projects. I assume that there are N such investors, identical and competitive ex
ante, denoted V C1, V C2... and V CN . If the first entrepreneur succeeds in ob-
taining funding for his project at date 0, denote by V C1 the venture capitalist
that provides the funding. As discussed below, thanks to his involvement with the
project, V C1 will have access to more information at date 1 than other venture
capitalists.
2.4. Information
I assume that γ is only observed by the incumbent and V C1 at t = 1. The notion
that firm "insiders", and in particular the firm’s entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist funding the firm, possess an informational advantage concerning the
firm’s progress and prospects seems a very reasonable assumption in the context
of young, entrepreneurial firms (see, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994),
Dessí (2005) and Schmidt (2003)). For example, having been closely involved in
the development of a new product or technology, they may possess soft information
about its quality and the potential spillovers; they are also likely to have superior
information about the quality of the entrepreneur’s and the management team’s
skills.
13A sufficient condition for (A4) in our model would be: eHS + (1− eH)(πL −KE) < 0.
14Analyses of mixed-strategy equlibria when this assumption is relaxed can be found in the
literature on informed lending (see Rajan (1992), Von Thadden (2004)). In these settings the
informed investor is still able to exploit his informational advantage, albeit less than in the pure
strategy equilibrium analyzed in this paper. The main qualitative insights of our analysis would
therefore continue to hold.
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2.5. Time line
t = 0 (First period) t = 1 (Second period) t = 2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Project I Realization of γ. Project
undertaken? Entry? returns
Incumbent realized.
chooses effort.
3. No entry
This section briefly presents the benchmark case where entry is ruled out a pri-
ori : optimal financial contracts for this case will provide a useful benchmark for
comparison. In subsequent sections, I shall allow for the possibility of entry.
Suppose then that no entry can occur at date 1. In this case the only financial
contract to be examined is the one agreed at date 0 to provide funding for the
incumbent.
Given that γ is a sufficient statistic for effort, the most efficient way to elicit
effort from the incumbent is to offer him a reward, Re > 0, contingent on the
realization of the "good" state at date 1 (i.e., when γ = γG), and zero otherwise
(because of limited liability). V C1 provides the initial capital KI at date 0 and
receives the project’s returns at date 2. Competition among venture capitalists at
date 0 ensures that the incumbent obtains the full expected NPV of the project.
The optimal financing contract, denoted by C1, solves the following problem, P1:
Max U = eRe −
1
2
e2 (3.1)
e = Re (IC) (3.2)
eγGR + (1− e)γBR− eRe  KI (IR) (3.3)
where (IC) is the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint and (IR) the venture capi-
talist’s participation constraint. It can be easily checked that the first-best effort
level, which maximizes the project’s expected returns net of effort costs, is given
by eFB ≡ ∆γR. To implement this would require setting Re = ∆γR (from (IC)).
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This would imply that the maximum income that could be pledged to V C1 would
be equal to γBR. By assumption (A1), this will not be sufficient to satisfy (IR).
Thus (IR) will bind. To make the analysis interesting, I assume that parameter
values are such that the project can be funded (see the Appendix for details).
Effort will then be equal to:
eN =
1
2
∆γR+
1
2
{[(∆γR]2 + 4[γBR −KI ]}
1
2 (3.4)
Effort will be lower than the first-best level: in the absence of entry consider-
ations, this is the only source of inefficiency. Next we consider whether allowing
for the possibility of entry introduces further inefficiencies, and whether it also
mitigates inefficiency in some cases. In particular, we study how this depends on
whether complete or incomplete contracts are used, and the resulting trade-off.
4. Entry
I now allow for the possibility of entry at date 1. I begin by analyzing the case
where the incumbent and V C1 at date 0 sign a contract contingent on the real-
ization of γ, and execution of the contract at date 1 reveals γ to outside parties
("complete contracts"). I will then study the case where the contract is not con-
tingent on the realization of γ, so as to avoid revealing information to outside
parties ("incomplete contracts"). The end of the section will examine what can
be achieved with secretly-executed complete contracts.
The timing of the game at date 1 is as follows. The state γ is realized and
is observed by the incumbent and his investor (V C1). A second entrepreneur
(the entrant) seeks financing for a related project, project E. Venture capitalists
(V C1, V C2, ..., V CN) make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the entrant.
The entrant accepts one offer (or zero). If he accepts an offer (other than the null
contract), project E is undertaken. Both projects’ returns are realized at t = 2.
4.1. Complete contracts
The optimal complete contract agreed at t = 0 between the incumbent and V C1
takes the form studied above for the no-entry case: the entrepreneur receives a
reward Re if, and only if, γ = γG, while the investor receives the project’s final
returns. As in the no-entry case, this type of contract is optimal because it elicits
effort efficiently from the incumbent. Given this form of contract between the
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incumbent and V C1, we can examine the game between the entrant and investors
at date 1 and then solve backwards for the optimal date-0 contract.
4.1.1. The game at date 1
Investors and the entrant learn the realized value of γ at t = 1, when the incum-
bent is rewarded (or not). The game between them therefore takes place under
symmetric information. When the realized state is unfavorable for the entrant
(i.e. γ = γB), nobody is willing to fund his project. When the state is favorable,
competition among investors ensures that the entrant is able to fund his project
and obtain its full expected NPV . This also implies a loss for V C1, because entry
reduces the success probability of the incumbent’s project. We therefore have the
following result.
Lemma 1 (date 1 game with complete contracts). When γ = γB, there is
no entry. When γ = γG, entry always occurs: the entrant’s expected gain from
his project is equal to its full expected NPV , S, while the expected value of the
incumbent’s project is reduced by µR.
Proof : see Appendix.
Because he has no informational advantage at date 1, V C1 not only cannot
extract any rents from the entrant, but he incurs a loss when γ = γG, due to the
fact that other venture capitalists’ funding offers to the entrant do not internalize
the costs imposed by entry on the incumbent’s project. We can now examine the
implications for financing constraints ex ante.
4.1.2. The game at date 0
The optimal financial contract between the incumbent and V C1 at date 0 will
solve the following problem:
Max U = eRe −
1
2
e2 (4.1)
e = Re (IC) (4.2)
e(γG − µ)R + (1− e)γBR− eRe  KI (IR) (4.3)
It is straightforward to verify that the first-best effort level is now lower than
in the no-entry case, and is equal to eFBC = (∆γ − µ)R. This is because entry
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reduces the expected value of the incumbent’s project, and hence the return to
effort.
However, the investor’s participation constraint is harder to satisfy, because
pledgeable income is reduced by the possibility of subsequent entry. Thus once
again it is not possible to implement the first-best level of effort. We therefore
obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. (a) Either (i) the incumbent’s project cannot be funded. This
happens when KI is "too large" (see the Appendix for precise details); or (ii) the
incumbent’s project is funded, and the incumbent’s effort level is equal to:
eC =
1
2
(∆γ − µ)R+
1
2
{[(∆γ − µ)R]2 + 4[γBR−KI ]}
1
2 (4.4)
where eC < eN .
(b) The incumbent’s expected utility when the project is funded is equal to
U =
1
2
(eC)2, which is strictly lower than in the no-entry case.
Proof : see Appendix.
Thus with complete contracts we find that allowing for the possibility of entry
may make it impossible to undertake the incumbent’s project. Moreover, if the
project is undertaken, entrepreneurial effort on the project will be strictly lower
than in the no-entry case, as will the incumbent’s expected utility. Overall then,
allowing for the possibility of entry is "bad news" for the incumbent when complete
contracts are used.
Can the incumbent be better off with an incomplete contract? We now turn
to this question.
4.2. Incomplete contracts
In this section we examine what happens if the incumbent and V C1 at date 0
sign a contract that is not contingent on γ, and outside parties (entrant, other
venture capitalists) do not have access to information about the realized value of
γ at date 1.
At date 0, the contract between the incumbent and V C1 can only condition
on the realization of final project returns. It will therefore take the form CI =
{RI , RV }, where Rj denotes the payoff for j (j = I, V ) at t = 2 when realized final
returns are equal to R. I denotes the incumbent and V the venture capitalist.
The timing of the game is the same as in the case of complete contracts studied
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above. As before, we solve the game by backward induction, starting from date
1.
4.2.1. The game at date 1
Only V C1 learns the realized value of γ at date 1; the other venture capitalists
and the entrant do not. The game between them therefore takes place under
asymmetric information. The equilibrium is described by the following result.
Lemma 2 (date 1 game with incomplete contracts). When γ = γB, there is
no entry. When γ = γG, entry always occurs: V C1 funds the entrant and extracts
all the surplus from him, with expected value S.
Proof : see Appendix.
This result shows the main benefit from incomplete contracts in this setting:
in contrast with the complete contracts case examined earlier, V C1 here can use
his informational advantage to extract the entrant’s surplus. We now explore the
implications for the contract between V C1 and the incumbent ex ante, and for
the incumbent’s choice of effort.
4.2.2. The game at date 0
The optimal financial contract between the incumbent and V C1 at date 0 will
solve the following problem:
Max U ≡ e(γG − µ)RI + (1− e)γBRI −
1
2
e2 (4.5)
subject to the constraints:
e = argmax(U) (IC) (4.6)
e[(γG − µ)RV + S] + (1− e)γBRV  KI (IR) (4.7)
RI +RV = R (4.8)
RI  0, RV  0 (LL) (4.9)
where the first two constraints represent, as before, the incumbent’s incentive com-
patibility constraint and the venture capitalist’s participation constraint, while the
following two are the feasibility and limited liability constraints.
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There are two key differences relative to the analogous problem with complete
contracting. First, the venture capitalist is able to extract the entrant’s sur-
plus in the "good" state (γG). This makes the incumbent’s effort more valuable.
Moreover, the expected surplus from the entrant essentially increases pledgeable
income, relaxing the investor’s participation constraint. Second, the entrepreneur
is now rewarded less efficiently through a stake in the project’s final returns, rather
than a reward directly tied to the realization of the performance signal γ. The
interaction between these two effects gives the result summarized by Proposition
2. Let α ≡ ∆γ − µ. Then:
Proposition 2. (a) Either (i) the incumbent’s project cannot be funded. This
happens essentially when S is "too small" (see the Appendix for precise details);
or (ii) the incumbent’s project is funded, and the incumbent’s effort level is equal
to eI ≡ min[e∗, eH ], where
e∗ =
1
2
[αR+ S −
γB
α
] +
1
2
{[αR+ S −
γB
α
]2 + 4[γBR−KI]}
1
2 (4.10)
(b) The incumbent’s expected utility when the project is funded is equal to:
U =
1
2
(eI)2 + γBe
I
α
.
Proof : see Appendix.
Intuitively, when the surplus that can be extracted from the entrant is too
small, the inefficiency of rewarding the entrepreneur on the basis of final returns
rather than intermediate performance dominates and incomplete contracts per-
form poorly. For higher values of the surplus, however, the venture capitalist’s
participation constraint is relaxed, making it possible to induce higher effort and
better performance.
4.3. Complete contracts or incomplete contracts?
We can now examine the trade-off between complete and incomplete contracts.
The essence of the trade-off is the following. Under complete contracting, the
incumbent can be given a reward contingent on the realization of γ, which is a
sufficient statistic for effort. Under incomplete contracting, his effort incentives
can only be provided, less efficiently, by giving him a share of the project’s final
returns. This represents the disadvantage of incomplete contracting. However,
incomplete contracting enables V C1 to extract some informational rents from
the entrant when γ = γG. Moreover, the expectation of this relaxes the venture
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capitalist’s ex ante participation constraint, which makes it easier to induce effort.
These are the benefits of incomplete contracting.
For some parameter values, the trade-off between complete and incomplete
contracts takes a particularly stark form, in the sense that the incumbent’s project
can only secure funding with one type of contract. This is easily seen by noting
(see the proof of Proposition 1) that funding can only be secured under complete
contracts if
KI 
1
4
[αR]2 + γBR (4.11)
while the corresponding condition under incomplete contracts (see the proof of
Proposition 2) is given by:
KI 
1
4
[αR+ S −
γB
α
]2 + γBR (4.12)
Clearly for sufficiently small values of S, the expected value of informational
rents under incomplete contracting, it may be possible to fund the incumbent
under complete contracting but not under incomplete contracting. Conversely,
for sufficiently large values of S it may be possible to fund the incumbent under
incomplete contracting but not under complete contracting.
There is a threshold value of S such that pledgeable income is higher with
incomplete contracts above the threshold, and higher with complete contracts
below the threshold. This threshold is given by Sˆ ≡ γB
α
. It has an intuitive
interpretation: with incomplete contracts, the incumbent’s expected returns in
the "bad" state γB are equal to γBRI = γB(
eI
α
), while under complete contracts
they are equal to zero. Thus from an ex-ante perspective, incomplete contracting
implies that the incumbent has to be given rents of value e
IγB
α
, which reduce the
project income that can be pledged to the venture capitalist. On the other hand,
incomplete contracting also implies that the venture capitalist expects to earn
informational rents (from the entrant) of value S with probability eI . Pledgeable
income will be higher with incomplete contracts if, and only if, eIS > e
IγB
α
.
Consider now the trade-off arising when the two conditions are both satisfied,
and the incumbent’s project can secure funding with either type of contract15. In
this case, the incumbent’s expected payoff with complete contracting is equal to
the NPV of his project (since venture capitalists at date 0 are competitive, so
15Obviously when neither condition is satisfied no trade-off arises because the incumbent’s
project cannot be undertaken with any contract.
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that V C1 does not earn any rents from the incumbent), taking into account the
effect of entry. It is given by:
NPV C = eC(γG − µ)R+ (1− e
C)γBR−
1
2
(eC)2 −KI (4.13)
The incumbent’s expected payoff under incomplete contracting is equal to the
NPV of his project, taking into account the effect of entry, plus the expected
value of the investor’s informational rents. It is therefore given by:
NPV I = eI [(γG − µ)R+ S] + (1− e
I)γBR −
1
2
(eI)2 −KI (4.14)
Thus, incomplete contracts will be preferred if, and only if, the incumbent’s
net benefit from using incomplete contracts, NBI, is positive:
NBI ≡ eIS + (eI − eC)αR−
1
2
[(eI)2 − (eC)2] > 0 (C∗)
The first term in this expression represents the expected value of the venture
capitalist’s informational rents: these rents are the direct benefit of incomplete
contracting. The other two terms reflect the impact of any difference between
the equilibrium effort levels induced under complete and incomplete contracting.
Intuition might suggest that this impact should be negative, because incomplete
contracts reward entrepreneurial effort less efficiently than complete contracts. If
this is the case, the choice between complete and incomplete contracts will depend
on the trade-off between the benefit of earning informational rents with incom-
plete contracts and the benefit of inducing effort more efficiently with complete
contracts. However, effort under complete contracting may be reduced signifi-
cantly below its first-best level by the need to generate sufficient pledgeable income
to satisfy the investor’s participation constraint. With incomplete contracts, on
the other hand, the expected value of the investor’s informational rents becomes
part of pledgeable income, making it easier to satisfy the constraint: this is the
potential indirect benefit of incomplete contracting. If this effect is sufficiently
important, the sum of the last two terms in the above expression may also be
positive, enhancing the net benefit of incomplete contracts.
To gain further insight into the trade-off, we can use (8.15) and (8.29) to write
the net benefit of incomplete contracts as follows:
NBI ≡
1
2
{eIS + (eI − eC)αR+
eIγB
α
}
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This expression makes clear that for eI  eC incomplete contracts will be
preferred. Indeed, for complete contracts to be preferred instead, eC has to be
sufficiently greater than eI to offset the other positive terms in the expression. It
is immediately apparent from the expressions for the two efforts (given in Proposi-
tions 1 and 2) that eI  eC if, and only if, S  Sˆ. Intuitively, when this condition
holds, pledgeable income is at least as high with incomplete contracting as with
complete contracting, making it possible to elicit at least as much effort from the
incumbent. Thus when the surplus that can be extracted from the entrant is
sufficiently large, there is no longer a trade-off: incomplete contracts yield infor-
mational rents and induce at least as much effort as complete contracts. For lower
values of S, the trade-off applies but is still favorable to incomplete contracts. Fi-
nally for sufficiently low values of S, the trade-off will switch in favor of complete
contracts.
4.4. When does the trade-off apply?
In the next section we will focus on the empirical implications of the analysis.
Before we do this, we need to ask two questions:
• can information disclosure be prevented in the presence of complete con-
tracts?
• will information disclosure occur even in the presence of incomplete con-
tracts?
Intuition might suggest that complete contracts with secret execution could
do better than any of the contracts considered so far, by combining the benefits
of more efficient reward schemes for entrepreneurial effort with the benefits of not
revealing information about γ to outside parties. Such "secretly-executed com-
plete contracts" would specify that the incumbent is to be rewarded if, and only
if, γ = γG, as in the complete contracting case examined earlier. However, the
execution of the contract at date 1 would be kept secret; in particular, the incum-
bent would be rewarded secretly when γ = γG, so as not to reveal information
about γ to outside parties.
My claim is that this would not work. Suppose the incumbent and V C1 sign
an ex-ante (date 0) agreement to keep contractual execution secret ex post (date
1). When they reach date 1, the contract is executed: this requires establishing
the realized value of γ and hence determining the value of the incumbent’s reward
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(Re or zero). If γ = γG, the incumbent receives the reward Re from V C1. Large
rewards typically generate hard evidence (e.g. granting of equity or options, bank
transfers), available to the incumbent. Even if V C1 paid the reward privately in
cash, the incumbent would want to keep some hard evidence of how and why he
received a large sum in cash (e.g. tax authorities, controls on money laundering).
Thus when γ = γG, contractual execution will generate hard evidence infor-
mative about γ, available to the incumbent. This means that in the equilibrium
described by Lemma 2, in which V C1 extracts informational rents from the en-
trant, an uninformed venture capitalist will now have an incentive to "deviate"
by offering the incumbent a payment in return for seeing evidence that he has re-
ceived the transfer Re from V C1. The incumbent would gain by doing this secret
side deal with the uninformed venture capitalist when γ = γG, and the venture
capitalist would gain from becoming informed: he could offer the entrant slightly
more favorable terms than V C1 and extract most of the surplus. It seems very
difficult to rule out such behavior by including a confidentiality clause in the orig-
inal contract between the incumbent and V C1. The "deviation" does not require
the incumbent to hand over any evidence to the uninformed venture capitalist: it
is enough to show it. This would make it extremely hard to prove ex post that
the confidentiality clause had been breached.
Agreeing at date 1 to defer payment of the reward until date 2would not change
matters: the incumbent would still have hard evidence that he is due to receive the
reward at date 2, which is just as informative as receipt of the reward at date 1.
To avoid information disclosure, the incumbent and V C1 would need to agree at
date 0 to defer until date 2 the very process of establishing whether a reward is due
or not. However, whether the information about γ is elicited from the incumbent
and V C1 through a mechanism based on subgame perfect implementation, or
relying on pre-trial discovery in the event of a dispute (see footnote 4), delay will
be problematic: in the first case, information may no longer be payoff-relevant
and hence could not be elicited; in the second case, pre-trial discovery will be less
efficient, because as circumstances evolve over time it becomes difficult to establish
what the precise "state of the world" was at a given point earlier in time (people
forget information or remember it inaccurately; they move; they die; records are
updated and some information is lost; products, facilities and technologies are
also updated and modified; etc.).
Turning to the second question: in the presence of incomplete contracts, no
evidence concerning γ is generated by execution of the contract at date 1, because
the contract is not contingent on γ. Information disclosure to outside parties could
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still occur at date 1 if the contracting parties had access to hard evidence about
the realized value of γ irrespective of contractual execution. However, our focus
is on settings where this is not the case and the contracting parties have access to
soft information.
5. Empirical implications
When are we most likely to observe incomplete venture capital contracts in the
sense of this paper (i.e. contracts that make less use of performance contingen-
cies)? The following result provides a first answer.
Lemma 3. The net benefit from incomplete contracts, NBI, increases with
S.
Proof : see Appendix.
Thus our model implies that incomplete contracts will be more attractive when
entrants are expected to be more profitable (higher S). It also implies that when
incomplete contracts are used with incumbents, venture capitalists should be able
to extract more surplus from entrants. To my knowledge, neither of these pre-
dictions has been tested. Indeed, empirical evidence on the factors driving the
degree of incompleteness of venture capital contracts is very limited. However, as
discussed in the Introduction, there is substantial evidence that venture capital
contracts tend to be more incomplete in California. As shown by Chen, Gompers,
Kovner and Lerner (2009), clustering of both venture capital firms and venture
capital-financed companies is very high, and California is home to arguably the
most important cluster16. Chen et al. (2009) point to the benefits of labor mar-
ket pooling and localized knowledge spillovers as key factors driving clustering. In
terms of our model, positive spillover effects of this kind, other things being equal,
are going to increase the expected profitability of entrants, hence the value of S.
This in turn increases the net benefit of incomplete contracts, providing a ratio-
nale for the California effect. Moreover, Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2010) find
that venture capitalists are able to obtain significantly lower valuations, control-
ling for other value drivers, in more densely networked venture capital markets,
16Chen et al. (2009) investigate the geography of venture capital firms and venture capital-
backed portfolio companies. They find that in 2005 the San Jose-San Francisco area accounted
for 21.6% of all venture capital firm Main Offices, the single biggest share for any location. For
a sample of 28,434 venture capital investments between 1975 and 2005, they find that 29.01%
were in portfolio companies located in the San Jose-San Francisco area, again the highest share
for any location.
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such as Silicon Valley17, suggesting that venture capitalists in these markets tend
to pay lower prices for their deals, and therefore extract greater surplus. This is
also in line with the model’s predictions.
For simplicity, the analysis so far assumed that when the incumbent is suc-
cessful at date 1, there is a (profitable) potential entrant with probability one. If
we allow this probability to vary, the net benefit of incomplete contracts will be
increasing in the probability, since incomplete contracts enable the venture capi-
talist to extract informational rents when there is a potential profitable entrant.
The model therefore predicts that incomplete contracts will be more attractive
when the probability of a potentially profitable entrant emerging is higher. This
probability is likely to be higher in R&D-intensive industries, with substantial
investments in innovative projects whose outcomes may be complementary to the
incumbent’s when successful. The available evidence on this is consistent with
the model: Kaplan and Stromberg (2003, 2004) find that incomplete venture cap-
ital contracts are significantly more common for firms in industries with a high
R&D/sales ratio.
The model, again for simplicity, assumes that there is only one effort decision,
made by the entrepreneur at the beginning. Extending the model to allow for a
second effort decision, in the second period, would raise the question of whether
the intial entrepreneur (founder) should be retained, or a replacement found, who
would then take the second effort decision. In general, this will depend on a
variety of factors, including the importance of the founder’s human capital for the
long-term performance of the company. The replacement decision in the venture
capital context has been studied by Hellmann (1998). The analysis in the present
paper suggests a new issue to consider: the possible information leakage when the
original contract specifies that the entrepreneur will be replaced if, and only if,
the realized intermediate state is poor (γ = γB).
Such explicit contracting is not typically observed, but time vesting of the
founder’s shares, combined with the allocation of significant control rights to
venture capitalists, can often achieve the same purpose, and have similar im-
plications for information leakage. When venture capitalists are given sufficient
control rights, they can intervene to have the entrepreneur replaced by the board.
This may be worthwhile if the entrepreneur has not been successful in the first
period and there is time vesting, implying that he will have a much lower claim
17See also Castilla (2003) for evidence that collaboration networks among venture capital firms
in Silicon Valley are more dense and dominated by more connected cliques than in Route 128.
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on future returns if he is replaced before the vesting date.18 Replacement of the
entrepreneur in this case signals that γ = γB.
19 The analysis in this paper thus
suggests that, when the gain from avoiding information disclosure is sufficiently
large, time vesting combined with the allocation of substantial control rights to
venture capitalists should be less prevalent. This is consistent with the evidence
on time vesting and control rights in California contracts.20
Overall then, the available empirical evidence seems consistent with the theo-
retical model developed in this paper. This yields some interesting implications.
First, our model predicts that when S is sufficiently large (S > Sˆ), it becomes
possible to finance the incumbent with an incomplete contract even when the
incumbent would be unable to obtain funding for his project with a complete con-
tract. Second, when S is sufficiently large (again S > Sˆ), the optimal incomplete
contract will induce a higher level of entrepreneurial effort than the optimal com-
plete contract. Thus when expected positive spillovers are sufficiently important
(entrants’ expected profitability is sufficiently high), the use of optimally incom-
plete venture capital contracts can increase the number of start-ups able to obtain
funding, and increase innovative effort. This may help to explain the particularly
successful performance of venture capital in California.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the interaction between innovation, spillovers
and contract design in venture capital. When innovative start-up firms generate
sufficiently large spillovers for subsequent potential entrants, it can be optimal to
18For example, suppose that the founder’s human capital is important for continuing the same
strategy that has been successful in the first period; on the other hand, if that first strategy has
not been very successful, a different strategy is more efficient in the second period and can be
implemented at least as well by a replacement.
19Note that without time vesting combined with substantial control rights for the VC, the
replacement of the founder is much more likely to be due to the founder’s voluntary departure,
and outsiders cannot typically observe the reasons for a separation.
20Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find a significant negative "California effect" on the sensitivity
of the founder’s payoff to time vesting. They also find that venture capitalists are less likely to
have redemption rights in California. These enable VCs to require repurchase of their shares by
the company, and can be used to force liquidation (Gompers (1997)). Presumably they can also
be used to put pressure on the board to replace the founder (even when VCs do not have board
control and voting control). Bengtsson and Ravid (2009) further find that VCs are less likely
to receive a variety of other control rights in California. These too may be used to put pressure
on the board.
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adopt more "incomplete" contracts. Although these contracts may entail some ef-
ficiency loss (in our model, a less efficient reward scheme for the entrepreneur), this
loss is more than offset by the efficiency gains. By avoiding information leakage,
the contracting parties are able to extract informational rents from subsequent
entrants; ex ante, the expectation of these rents relaxes financing constraints and
makes it possible to provide more high-powered incentives to entrepreneurs, in-
creasing innovative effort.
Thus spillovers and contractual design become mutually reinforcing. Our
analysis can therefore shed light on the observed geographical correlations be-
tween contractual design and localized spillovers. We view this explanation as
a valuable complement to more traditional accounts based on regional cultural
differences.
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8. Appendix
The optimal contract when entry is ruled out exogenously (problem
P1)
The problem is:
Max U = eRe −
1
2
e2 (8.1)
e = Re (IC) (8.2)
eγGR + (1− e)γBR− eRe  KI (IR) (8.3)
The first-best effort level maximizes the project’s expected returns net of effort
costs, i.e.
eγGR + (1− e)γBR−
1
2
e2 (8.4)
and is given by eFB ≡ ∆γR. To implement this would require setting Re = ∆γR
(from (IC)). This would imply that the maximum income that could be pledged
to V C1 would be equal to γBR. By assumption (A1), this will not be sufficient
to satisfy (IR). Thus (IR) will bind. We can write (IR) as follows:
e∆γR+ γBR− e
2
 KI (8.5)
Differentiating the LHS gives ∆γR − 2e, implying that the LHS increases from
an initial value of γBR for e = 0 to
1
4
(∆γR)2 + γBR for e =
1
2
∆γR, decreasing
thereafter.
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We assume that parameter values are such that the project can be financed:
1
4
(∆γR)2 + γBR  KI (A5) (8.6)
Effort will therefore be equal to the largest root of the following equation:
(e∆γ + γB)R− e
2 = KI (8.7)
i.e.
eN =
1
2
∆γR+
1
2
{[∆γR]2 + 4[γBR −KI ]}
1
2 (8.8)
Proof of Lemma 1.
When γ = γB, by assumption it is unprofitable to fund the entrant. When
γ = γG, by the same assumption it is profitable to fund the entrant. Competition
among venture capitalists V C2, ..., V CN ensures that they are willing to fund
the entrant on terms that give them zero expected profits. Thus the entrant’s
expected gain from his project is equal to its full expectedNPV , S. Entry reduces
the expected value of the incumbent’s project by µR, implying a corresponding
loss for V C1 since he receives the final returns from the incumbent’s project.
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) The problem is:
Max U = eRe −
1
2
e2 (8.9)
e = Re (IC) (8.10)
e(γG − µ)R + (1− e)γBR− eRe  KI (IR) (8.11)
The first-best effort level, eFBC , maximizes the project’s NPV , taking into account
costs of entry; i.e.
e[γG − µ− γB]R + γBR−KI −
1
2
e2 (8.12)
and is equal to
eFBC = (∆γ − µ)R (8.13)
28
Implementing this effort level would require setting Re = (∆γ − µ)R, which
would not satisfy (IR). Thus (IR) will bind. We can write (IR) as follows:
e(∆γ − µ)R+ γBR− e
2
 KI (8.14)
Differentiating the LHS gives (∆γ − µ)R− 2e, implying that the LHS increases
from an initial value of γBR for e = 0 to
1
4
[(∆γ−µ)R]2+γBR for e =
1
2
(∆γ−µ)R,
decreasing thereafter.
Thus if KI >
1
4
[(∆γ − µ)R]2 + γBR, (IR) cannot be satisfied and the project
cannot be funded. Otherwise, the project will be funded and effort will be given
by the largest root of:
e(∆γ − µ)R+ γBR− e
2 = KI (8.15)
i.e.
eC =
1
2
(∆γ − µ)R+
1
2
{[(∆γ − µ)R]2 + 4[γBR−KI ]}
1
2 (8.16)
To show that eC < eN , suppose not; i.e. eC  eN . From (8.15) we know that
(eC∆γ + γB)R− (e
C)2 = KI + µRe
C > KI (8.17)
This means that eC would also be feasible in the no-entry case, and indeed that
a higher effort than eC would be feasible in the no-entry case since there is some
slack in the investor’s participation constraint for the no-entry case evaluated for
effort equal to eC. Thus eN could not be the solution to problem P1.
(b) The incumbent’s expected utility with complete contracts is equal to U =
1
2
(eC)2, his expected utility in the no-entry case is U =
1
2
(eN)2, and we have just
proved that eC < eN .
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the following candidate equilibrium strategies:
(i) V C1. If the realized state is γB, never offer to fund the entrant. If the
realized state is γG, offer to fund him on terms that extract the full surplus from
his project (i.e. V C1 provides the initial capital KE in return for the project’s
final returns).
(ii) Uninformed venture capitalists. Never offer to fund the entrant.
(iii) Entrant. Accept the best offer.
Given these strategies, if an uninformed venture capitalist deviates by offering
to fund the project on more favorable terms for the entrant (i.e. he offers to
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provide the initial capital KE in return for a share of the project’s final returns,
the share being less than one), he knows that his offer will be accepted by the
entrant in both states. He therefore expects to make a loss (by assumption (A4)).
If he offers to fund the entrant on the same terms as V C1 (i.e. he offers to provide
the initial capital KE in return for the project’s final returns), his offer will be
accepted with probability one when γ = γB, and with probability p =
1
2
when
γ = γG, so again he expects to make a loss
21. Thus uninformed venture capitalists
have no incentive to deviate. V C1 has no incentive to deviate either because his
strategy yields the highest possible expected return for him in the date 1 game.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(a) The problem is:
Max U ≡ e(γG − µ)RI + (1− e)γBRI −
1
2
e2 (8.18)
subject to the constraints:
e = argmax(U) (IC) (8.19)
e[(γG − µ)RV + S] + (1− e)γBRV  KI (IR) (8.20)
RI +RV = R (8.21)
RI  0, RV  0 (LL) (8.22)
From (IC) we have
e = (∆γ − µ)RI (8.23)
The first-best effort level, eFBI , maximizes the project’s NPV , taking into account
costs of entry and surplus extracted from the entrant; i.e.
e[(γG − µ)R+ S] + (1− e)γBR−KI −
1
2
e2 (8.24)
and is equal to
eFBI = [∆γ − µ]R+ S (8.25)
21Obviously this will also be true for any other value of p.
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Implementing eFBI would require setting
RI = R+
S
∆γ − µ
(8.26)
which would not satisfy (IR). Thus either (IR) binds or the feasibility con-
straint e  eH binds. Define α ≡ ∆γ − µ. We can then write (IR) as follows
e[αRV + S] + γBRV  KI (8.27)
and replace RV = R−RI = R−
e
α
(using (IC)) to obtain
e[αR+ S −
γB
α
]− e2 + γBR  KI (8.28)
Differentiating the LHS gives αR + S − γB
α
− 2e, and differentiating again gives
−2. If αR+S − γB
α
 0, the LHS is maximized at e = 0, and the project cannot
be funded (by assumption (A1)). If αR+ S − γB
α
> 0, the LHS is maximized at
e = 1
2
[αR + S − γB
α
]. Thus if 1
4
[αR + S − γB
α
]2 + γBR < KI , again the project
cannot be funded. When 1
4
[αR+S− γB
α
]2+ γBR  KI , we have two possibilities:
either the feasibility constraint e  eH is not binding, implying that the project
is funded and e is the largest root of the equation
e[αR+ S −
γB
α
]− e2 + γBR = KI (8.29)
i.e.
eI =
1
2
[αR + S −
γB
α
] +
1
2
{[αR + S −
γB
α
]2 + 4[γBR−KI ]}
1
2 (8.30)
or the feasibility constraint is binding, implying that the project is funded if, and
only if, eH [αR+ S − γB
α
]− (eH)2 + γBR  KI . In this case e
I = eH .
(b) The incumbent’s expected utility is given by
U ≡ e[γG − µ− γB]RI + γBRI −
1
2
e2 =
1
2
e2 +
γBe
α
(8.31)
Proof of Lemma 3
The net benefit of incomplete contracts is
NBI ≡
1
2
{eIS + (eI − eC)αR+
eIγB
α
}
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Hence,
dNBI
dS
=
1
2
{eI + (S + αR+
γB
α
)
deI
dS
}
Using (8.29):
eI [αR+ S −
γB
α
]− (eI)2 + γBR = KI (8.32)
we obtain
deI [αR+ S −
γB
α
− 2eI ] = −eIdS (8.33)
Thus de
I
dS
= −e
I
αR+S−
γB
α
−2eI
and dNBI
dS
= 1
2
{
−2eI(
γB
α
+eI )
αR+S−
γB
α
−2eI
} > 0 for eI > 1
2
[αR+S− γB
α
].
When eI = 1
2
[αR+S− γB
α
] it is straightforward to verify that a marginal increase
in S makes it possible to increase eI without violating the IR constraint. Thus
for eI  1
2
[αR+ S − γB
α
], i.e. the range of values of interest, NBI increases with
S.
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